Abstract-Traditional passwords are inadequate as cryptographic keys, as they are easy to forge and are vulnerable to guessing. Human biometrics have been proposed as a promising alternative due to their intrinsic nature. Electrocardiogram (ECG) is an emerging biometric that is extremely difficult to forge and circumvent, but has not yet been heavily investigated for cryptographic key generation. ECG has challenges with respect to immunity to noise, abnormalities, etc. In this paper, we propose a novel key generation approach that extracts keys from real-valued ECG features with high reliability and entropy in mind. Our technique, called interval optimized mapping bit allocation (IOMBA), is applied to normal and abnormal ECG signals under multiple session conditions. We also investigate IOMBA in the context of different feature extraction methods, such as wavelet, discrete cosine transform, etc., to find the best method for feature extraction. Experiments of IOMBA show that 217-, 38-, and 100-bit keys with 99.9%, 97.4%, and 95% average reliability and high entropy can be extracted from normal, abnormal, and multiple session ECG signals, respectively. By allowing more errors or lowering entropy, key lengths can be further increased by tunable parameters of IOMBA, which can be useful in other applications. While IOMBA is demonstrated on ECG, it should be useful for other biometrics as well.
authentication, assurance of data integrity, and/or signatory nonrepudiation. Cryptography relies on two principal components: cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic keys. Cryptographic algorithms are publically known, but are designed around computational hardness assumptions, which ensure that they are difficult to break without knowledge of the cryptographic key.
Cryptographic keys must be kept secret and also possess certain properties (long length, high entropy, etc.). Traditional passwords or user-determined PINs are commonly used for access control, but are not appropriate for keys. Passwords are rarely long enough for cryptographic applications since they would be difficult for user to remember. This issue is only augmented by the fact that distinct passwords are often needed for different services. Finally, passwords can be stolen, guessed, or hacked, and then fraudulently used without the user knowledge.
To overcome some of the limitations of traditional passwords and smart cards, researchers have attempted to use biometrics for authentication and/or key generation. Biometrics are touted as the only method that truly identifies an authorized user. Biometric key generation can be divided into two classes: behavioral and physiological. In 2002, Monrose et al. proposed the first practical biometric key generation that exploits behavioral biometrics [1] . They used pattern duration of keystrokes and latencies between keystrokes with combination of password to increase the entropy of standard passwords. Handwritten signature [2] [3] [4] is another behavioral technique that uses dynamic and local features of a signature to generate a key. The keys generated by behavioral biometrics have been very short (e.g., about 40 in [2] ) making them less secure.
Several other cryptographic biometric methods are based on physiological traits of humans, which can be categorized into exterior and interior. The exterior group includes fingerprint [5] , [6] , face [7] , hand geometry [8] , and iris [9] . While the exterior biometrics have been researched heavily over the last few decades, they have significant disadvantages. Most notably, they are easy for attackers to access, are not robust against cloning [10] , [11] , and are vulnerable to presentation attacks. For instance, our fingers are involved in a lot of daily tasks such as touching keyboards, glasses, doorknobs, and so forth. Iris systems are susceptible to spoofing by printed photos. Audio recorders can be used for voice playback to circumvent speech recognition systems.
While external biometrics are easy to mimic or forge, internal biometrics modalities are more promising in this regard. The interior group includes DNA [12] , brain signal (EEG) [13] , electrocardiogram (ECG), and photoplethysmogram (PPG). Poon et al. [14] proposed the use of interpulse interval (IPI) to generate cryptographic keys. One hundred and twenty-eight IPIs were measured taking about 60 s each by computing the time difference between the peaks from two sources: ECG and PPG. Due to the noise in these physiological signals, generating binary values by this approach can result in high error. Symmetric cryptographic key has been proposed by Venkatasubramanian et al. [15] based on PPG as well. They applied PPG features to enable two sensors to agree on a common key. Once the features were generated, one of the two communicating sensors generates a random symmetric key which it then hides using the feature vector obtained from the PPG signal. Another research that uses ECG signal to generate cryptographic keys is reported in [16] . While they were able to obtain 240-bit keys after applying error correction code, the false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR) are still 4.6% and 7.9%.
In this paper, we are focused on improving key generation based on ECG. ECG offers several advantages.
1) ECG is considered to be unique to each person. An ECG is constructed by the delay between each part of the heart, such as sinoatrial, atrioventricular, etc., nodes. Physiological factors of the heart muscle, such as its size, orientation, and the timing of blood pumping in and out of the heart, etc., introduce unique properties to every person's ECG waveform [17] ; 2) Since ECG represents electrical activity of the heart and is a necessary sign of life, it possesses the quality of universality, a trait that many other biometrics lack. For example, amputees would not be able to use fingerprint or hand geometry systems; 3) Since ECG is a continuous physiological signal, it also has inherent real-time signs of liveliness, making it extremely difficult to steal and emulate. Thus, it avoids the need for additional liveliness detection at the sensor. 4) ECG is difficult to capture without cooperation from the person. 5) ECG is difficult, if not impossible, to replicate thereby making it resistant to presentation attacks. All that said, a major concern about ECG is its permanence, i.e., stability over long periods of time. In [18] , the authors evaluated the tendency of ECG variability over time and claimed that signals have not substantially changed. Current research on ECG for biometric authentication also seems to support this claim [19] [20] [21] . Note, however, that authentication applications are much more tolerant to noise than cryptographic keys. Cryptographic keys have strict requirements with respect to stability and entropy. Key stability requires that the key generated from the individual biometric data is 100% repeatable. The key entropy is related to the number of possible keys that can be generated. The entropy should be large enough to guarantee resistance against attacks. It is necessary, but not always easy to simultaneously achieve high key entropy and high key stability. To achieve higher reliability in authentication and/or key generation, error correcting codes (ECC) and fuzzy extraction have been proposed [5] , [16] . Such approaches correct up to a certain number of errors in terms of hamming distance from the original biometrics key/template, but with an unavoidable loss of entropy. Fuzzy extraction introduce potential drawbacks such as high computational cost, increased area overhead, and vulnerability to side channel attacks (such as timing, power analysis, etc.) [22] . This encourages us to propose new approaches to generate keys from biometric features to achieve high key entropy and reliability. By extension, these would also be useful for user identification.
A. Contributions and Paper Organization
Our main contributions in this paper are as follows. We compute the hamming distance and min-entropy (as measures of reliability and entropy, respectively) as well as length of keys based on different parameter settings in IOMBA. According to IOMBA, we could extract 217-bit keys (on average) with 99.9% reliability from normal ECG signals. Note that although our approach is applied here to ECG, it could be extended to other biometrics as well. 4) Feature selection: We review the ECG feature selection algorithms and apply IOMBA to each. We determine that the best feature extraction approach is maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform (MODWT) for multiple session ECGs, discrete cosine transform (DCT) for abnormal heart signals, and Daubechies wavelet transform for normal ECGs. Note that while there are other issues associated with biometrics (e.g., privacy, revocation, etc.), we consider these outside the scope of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the background of ECG including sources of noise, preprocessing steps, feature extraction methods, etc. In Section III, we discuss our ECG-based key generation approach, which is based on IOMBA quantization. Experiments and results are discussed in Section IV. In Section V, conclusions and plans for future work are provided.
II. ELECTROCARDIOGRAM

A. Background
ECG has been primarily used in medical applications. For instance, ECG can be used to diagnose cardiac diseases, which are the leading cause of death in the world. Heart disease includes any disorder that affects the heart's ability to function normally. Over the last few decades, there has been an increasing effort to develop computer-based automatic diagnostics of the ECG [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . More recently, ECG has been used for biometric identification [28] [29] [30] [31] . The ECG signal is generated by electrical current of the heart. The shapes of the ECG waveform depend on the anatomic features of the human body and heart, and thus are distinctive from one person to another.
There are various forms of heart disease, i.e., arrhythmia that can cause significant changes to the ECG morphology. In such cases, the ECG signal is considered "abnormal." Since arrhythmias are present in a large portion of the population [32] , biometric methods for key generation based on the ECG signal should not only be robust against general ECG noise but also cover abnormal ECG signal limitations.
In general, ECG biometric authentication and identification can be categorized based on feature extraction, classification, and multimodal framework. Fiducial features and nonfiducial features are popular methods for feature extraction. Support vector machine, neural network, and KNN are the types of classifiers. In addition, combination of ECG with other biometric modalities for human recognition has been used as discussed in [33] .
B. Preprocessing Steps
Typical biometric systems require preprocessing and feature extraction stages. In this section, we describe the unique processing and feature selection algorithms required for ECG. In the preprocessing stage, ECG signals are filtered to remove noise that can impact the biometric signal. The main types of ECG noise are low-frequency and high-frequency noise components, also commonly referred to as baseline drift and power line interference, respectively. High-frequency noise contains muscle artifacts and external interference. Electromyogram (EMG) is generated from electrical activity of the muscles and appears as rapid fluctuations, which are much faster than the ECG waves. Low-pass filters on the ECG are used to remove high-frequency noise. A high-pass filter can remove low-frequency components such as motion artifacts, respiratory variation, and baseline wander noise. In addition to these, physical stress and exercise can change the heart rate variability and morphology. For example, the heart rate can be calculated as the reciprocal of the R-R interval (i.e., time difference between two R peaks). As the heart rate increases, the QT interval will shorten much more than the rest of the intervals. This change can be corrected by normalizing the QT interval according to the heart rate [34] .
In this paper, we have employed fourth Butterworth bandpass filter with cutoff frequency 1-40 Hz to eliminate various kinds of noise in ECG signals based on empirical results. After filtering, R peak detection is generally required to segment individual heart beats and analyze the ECG signal. In this paper, we use the R peak detection algorithm proposed by Pan and Tompkins [35] . Then, we consider a fixed window by taking an identified R peak as a reference to segment the ECG signal in terms of R-R interval (RR). For simplicity, we have not considered the QT interval correction discussed above.
C. Feature Extraction Approaches
ECG feature extraction methods can be categorized into two major classes: fiducial point methods and nonfiducial methods. In fiducial point methods, the features of focus are the local features of heartbeats such as temporal or amplitude difference between consecutive fiducial points. In nonfiducial methods, feature extraction is based on overall morphology of waveform rather than specific fiducial points.
Since the performance of fiducial methods could limit universality (lack of fiducial points in abnormal signals), we will only consider nonfiducial methods of feature extraction in this paper and our discussions below.
1) Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT):
The DWT is a popular technique for time and frequency analysis. The nonstationary nature of ECG signals allows one to expand basic functions created by scaling and shifting of a single prototype function referred to as the mother wavelet. DWT is essentially a convolution of the wavelet function with the original signal.
Different wavelet families, such as Biorthogonal, Coiflet, Haar, Symmlet, Daubechies [36] , etc., exist in the literature and have been used for feature extraction. Haar wavelet is the simplest type of wavelet. Like all wavelet transforms, the Haar transform decomposes a discrete signal into two subsignals of half its length. In this work, different levels of Haar function have been examined; among all of them, seven-level decomposition achieves the best in terms of key length and reliability. Haar has the advantage of being simple to compute and easy to understand, but some information cannot be captured. Daubechies wavelet is conceptually more complicated than Haar and has higher computational overhead, but can pick up details, which are missed by the Haar wavelet. In this work, we found that "Db9" was the best among different Daubechies scales. The Coifman wavelet system is an orthogonal multiresolution wavelet system with vanishing moments not only for the wavelet functions, but also for the scaling functions. Based on our experiments, the fifth-order Coiflet ("coif5") with five-level decomposition is the best for feature extraction. The Biorthogonal family contains biorthogonal compactly supported spline wavelets. It uses separate wavelet and scaling functions for the analysis and synthesis of a signal. Our experiments demonstrate that "bior6.8" with six-level decomposition is the best for feature extraction. Another feature extraction method that has been used in the literature is the MODWT [16] . The MODWT is similar to the DWT in that both produce a set of time-dependent wavelet and scaling coefficients. The differences between DWT and MODWT are the highly redundant and nonorthogonal transforms that exist in MODWT. MODWT has the advantage of keeping the downsampled values at each level of the decomposition that would otherwise be discarded by the DWT. It also has higher effective degrees of freedom on each scale compared to DWT [37] .
However, the optimal choice of the wavelet function depends on the application. For instance, if an ECG signal is not well represented by one order of wavelet transform, another wavelet transform might be better. In this paper, the best wavelet transform for feature extraction from ECG is chosen according to three criteria: key length, min-entropy, and reliability. An ECG signal is a nonstationary signal and is distorted by several noise sources (motion artifact, baseline drift, and EMG). The noise generates variation for each feature value at different times. Therefore, feature extraction will be impacted by noise tolerance, which can generate an error in the reliability. DWTs are defined by using the convolution of the high-pass and low-pass filters with a signal to produce approximation and detail coefficients. Local behavior of the ECG signal is expected to be well captured by Daubechies wavelet transform due to properties of the vanish moments and support width. Since scale function of Daubechies wavelet transform is similar to ECG signal, hence, we can conclude that Daubechies wavelet filter is likely better than other techniques. Based on our experiments (see Sections IV-B-IV-C and supplemental material), we have found that the MODWT, DCT, and Biorthogonal are the best feature extraction methods for multiple session, abnormal ECGs, and normal ECGs, respectively.
2) DCT: DCT converts an ECG signal from time domain to frequency domain by the following equation:
where x(i) is the ECG signal and A(k) is the DCT coefficient.
In practice, we have found that most of the signal energy is compressed into the first several coefficients with the remaining coefficients near zero.
3) Normalize-Convolute Normalize (NCN): NCN is proposed in [38] for improved identification of individuals with abnormal ECGs. The approach focuses on the QRS complex, which is more invariant than other peaks over time. It begins by detecting the R peak. Then, an equal number of sample points from both sides of the identified R wave are selected. We refer the reader to [38] for more details.
Experimental results for nonfiducial approaches have shown high identification accuracy, but only when ECG measurements from the same session are used for training and identification. For example, Odinaka et al. [33] showed that all existing feature selection and classification approaches suffer significant performance degradation when measurements from different sessions are used. This motivates us to investigate more reliable approaches for ECG-based key generation.
III. ECG-BASED KEY GENERATION
A. Overview of the Proposed Approach
In this paper, we introduce a novel technique for key generation called IOMBA. Our approach has several salient features. First, the most reliable features for each person are determined by an enrollment step and only these features are used for key generation. This differs from most techniques that try to use all the features, even unreliable ones. In short, the features are selected based on population statistics and an individual's feature variance. Note that this will result in different key lengths per person in the population. Second, each feature that is selected as reliable can be quantized into one or more bits. This can increase the key length provided there is enough margin to do so. Once again, this is a function of population statistics. Third, both the reliable features and bit length for each feature are stored as helper data to regenerate the key later on. Note that the helper data only specifies the features and does not leak information in our approach. The feature space is quantized in such a way that every possible bit combination is equally likely for a feature. For instance, when quantizing to 1 bit, the probability of "0" and "1" is equal. When quantizing to 2 bits, the probability of "00," "01," "11," and "10" are equal. More details on quantization and IOMBA will be given below. Fig. 1 demonstrates the flow for the registration enrollment and key generation processes in our approach. During registration, the raw ECG signal is captured by an ECG sensing device. Many low-cost sensing devices have become available over the past few years (e.g., Nymi [39] ). Preprocessing is applied to remove baseline drift, EMG, etc., from the ECG. Then, the feature extraction methods (see Section II-C) are applied to the filtered ECG signals. The resulting features may have correlation. Therefore, correlation reduction is applied upon ECG features. Next, IOMBA is used to generate unique, reliable, and high-entropy keys from individuals. The binary encoding from features that are based on IOMBA algorithm is transformed into the template. Since IOMBA features may differ from one person to another, the indices corresponding to the selected features must also be stored as helper data for later use. During authentication, an enrolled user supplies an ECG to the biometrics system. The signal is preprocessed and features are extracted. The helper data are used to select the reliable features and quantize them to form the key. The key can be used to authenticate the individual by comparing it to a template. This would require storing the template in a suitable storage medium such as a database on a disk storage device or on a portable device such as a smart card. Alternatively, the key can simply be used to encrypt, decrypt, or digitally sign messages. 2 . Plots illustrating fixed quantization boundaries of a feature for (a) 1-bit and (b) 2-bit quantization cases. The solid signal refers to the probability distribution of a biometric feature for the entire population. The dotted signal refers to the probability distribution of the same biometric feature in the presence of noise for a specific individual in the population. Fig. 2 demonstrates the general quantization concept in which each feature is converted to one or more bits. It is assumed that samples from the entire population are able to characterize the background probability density function (PDF) of every feature. The background PDF is considered Gaussian with zero mean and unit standard deviation, i.e., N (0, 1). As illustrated in Fig. 2 , each feature can be quantized based on the number of bins (b) selected. In the case of two bins, the feature can be encoded into binary [0, 1] based on which side of the threshold (dash line) it lies. In the case of four bins, a feature is encoded into [00, 01, 11, 10] and so forth.
B. Analyzing Quantization Approaches
A number of bit extraction methods based on quantization and coding have been proposed in biometric applications. Binary quantization of biometric data was first proposed by Daugman [40] for iris authentication. Later, Tuyls et al. considered binary quantization in practical secret key generation [41] . Chen et al. proposed quantization of a real-valued vector of biometric features to a binary string by introducing detection rate optimized bit allocation (DROBA) [42] and quantization of element pairs in the polar domain [43] , which was multilevel quantizer based on likelihood ratio. They used fixed quantization where each bin contains 2 b background probability mass. In [44] , DROBA was improved by using dynamic search. However, none of the prior approaches choose bins in such a way that both reliability and randomness are considered.
C. IOMBA Quantization Assumptions and Approach
In this section, we present our module that aims to transform the real-valued ECG features into an adaptive length binary string. Unfortunately, the ECG signal suffers from noise, which may result in key generation errors. In general, the performance in biometric authentication is determined by two kinds of variability among the acquired biometric templates. The first one is variability within the subjects (i.e., intraclass variation), which determines minimum FRR and variability between subjects (i.e., interclass variation), whose lower limit sets a minimum FAR. Clearly, it is desirable for a biometric key generation system to have maximal variability between subjects but minimal variability within subjects. The ideal case for biometric-based key generation is that the standard deviation of the features within the subject is close to zero. On the other hand, standard deviation of the features between the subjects should be large enough so that keys from different subjects are sufficiently random and unpredictable. For key generation, the sources of errors are the same. So far, the quantization methods in the bit extraction module that have been proposed cannot completely eliminate intraclass variation. However, the module we present allows tradeoff between these sources of variation. Specifically, the allowable amount of intraclass variation can be tuned. The more (lesser) variations allowed per feature, the longer (shorter) the key and lesser (higher) the reliability.
Before discussing the details of IOMBA, we specify our assumptions.
1) The ECG statistics for the population are known, Gaussian, and normalized. We denote this PDF as PDF pop,f = N (μ = 0, σ = 1) for each ECG feature f . 2) The ECG statistics for each individual are computed during enrollment, are Gaussian, and normalized with respect to the population statistics. In order to incorporate the average noise statistics for features, we record the maximum σ of the population for each feature as σ * f . We will justify these assumptions for ECG and show how correlation between features can be removed for ECG in the next subsection. Note that although we apply the IOMBA technique on ECG, our approach can be extended to different types of biometrics such as iris, fingerprint, etc., provided that same assumptions hold.
Our approach for quantizing features to 2 bits is most clearly illustrated in Fig. 3 . The population PDF of a feature is shown in blue. The PDFs for the same feature in three subjects are shown. We have several input parameters that can be used to trade off reliability and entropy as well as output parameters that will be used to select "reliable" features. Note that all our parameters are illustrated on the left side of the PDF, but the right side will have similar parameters due to symmetry of the zero-mean normal distribution.
1) Outputs:
There are two types of outputs of our IOMBA qunatization module: thresholds and margins. In Fig. 3 , the thresholds are shown with dashed-dotted lines at points on the x-axis. One point is 0 and the other we denote by T . In our approach, if a feature is selected as "reliable," these thresholds are used to encode it as "00," "01," etc. This is conceptually similar to the existing quantization approaches (shown in Fig. 2 ), except that in our approach, thresholds are determined for optimal reliability and entropy for every given ECG feature in the space. In addition, our second type of output is the margin μ, which determines the range of values in which we would consider the feature as reliable (based on noise statistics). From μ and T , we can compute μ 00 = T − μ, μ left,01 = T + μ, and μ right,01 = 0 − μ. These are shown as dashed lines on the x-axis in the figure. If a feature from a subject is on the left side of μ 00 , it would be considered as reliable. Similarly, a feature from a subject lies between μ left,01 and μ right,01 , it would also be considered as reliable. Both the thresholds and margins will be computed based on desired reliability and entropy parameters.
2) Reliability parameter (β): Our first input to the module is a reliability parameter. The inset of Fig. 3 shows the overlap between a user's feature PDF and the T threshold. The amount of overlap indicates the amount of error that we can expect if the feature is chosen for the user's key. For instance, for the subject on the right side of T , the feature will be correctly encoded as "01" during key generation when the feature is measured to be on the right of T . However, due to noise, there will be an error encoding the feature if it appears on the left of T . We will refer to the maximum allowable overlap for a reliable feature as β. Thus, β controls the probability of error in (or reliability of) the key generation. For the 2-bit encoding case, only features that satisfy the following constraints can be selected for key generation
where μ f ,i denotes the mean for feature f of subject i. Note that similar constraints can be specified for μ f ,i > 0 , but are withheld for brevity. Based on our definitions above, the constraints can also be written as
3) Entropy parameter (α): Achieving high entropy requires that each bit value in the key be equally probable. In the case of our approach, this can also be restated that each feature is quantized into different bins (e.g., "00," "01," "11," and "10" for 2-bit case) with equal probability. For instance, let P 00 and P 01 denote the probability of a feature falling into bins "00" and "01," respectively. In our notation, these can be expressed as
Although P 00 = P 01 is ideal, it may be too restrictive in practice. As a result, it may not be possible to find thresholds and parameters to fulfill this condition, resulting in very few features for key generation. To relax this constraint, we introduce the entropy parameter α along with the following constraint:
Intuitively, α can be increased (decreased) in order to bias the probability of a feature appearing in bin "01" ("00"). By choosing α = 1, we can return to the more restrictive requirement P 00 = P 01 .
With the above input parameters and constraints in mind, it is possible to calculate optimal T and μ for a given feature. Our approach for the 2-bit case is as follows. We begin with the normalized Gaussian function
and the definite integral
The relation between the normalized Gaussian distribution and the error function is defined as
Therefore, (6)- (8) can be expressed as follows:
where σ * f indicates the worst-case standard deviation that has been achieved for entire population for feature f . By using σ * f in the formulation, we account for the worst-case noise. However, one could also consider an average case in our formulation if desired. The above system of equations can be solved for the optimal T and μ for each feature f . Then, for any given ECG, the features that satisfy the constraints above will be selected for each individual. If a feature does not fulfill the constraints, it can be discarded. The indices of features for each individual can be stored as helper data as discussed in Section III-A. Note that helper data will not leak much information provided that α is selected to be close to 1.
Note that the above formulation applies to the 2-bit case, but this approach can also be extended to 3 bits, 4 bits, etc. In practice, for each feature, one can quantize to the maximum number of bits based on the input reliability and entropy parameters: β and α.
To better understand IOMBA, we have illustrated it in Fig. 4 . Phase I of IOMBA is a preprocessing phase. During phase I, optimal margins and thresholds are calculated based on inputs α (reliability parameter), β (entropy parameter), and population statics. Phase II is an enrollment phase that occurs one time for every user. In phase II, the user's ECG is taken as the primary input, noise is removed by standard preprocessing techniques, features are extracted, and uncorrelated features are removed (see Section III-D for more details). The margins and thresholds for each feature (calculated in phase I) are then used to select the most reliable features from the user's ECG and quantize it into a high entropy key. The indexes of the selected features are stored as helper data for later. In addition, one can also include an optional fuzzy extraction GEN step to generate additional helper data that later corrects errors in the key. The key reconstruction is phase III. Here, the ECG signal undergoes the same initial steps as phase II. However, the feature indices determined from phase II are applied as an IOMBA quantization input to extract the same features as before. Finally, if necessary, fuzzy extractor REP can be used along with additional helper date to reconstruct the key without any errors. Note that while fuzzy extraction may be needed, the number of errors is expected to be dramatically reduced by IOMBA resulting in lesser overhead and loss in security.
D. Support of Assumptions
Previous works for biometric-based key generation assume that the biometric features are uncorrelated and independent, but in practice some correlation may exist between the features. This limitation can allow attackers to more easily break the system. In addition, it does not allow one to accurately measure entropy. To address this issue, we apply the following procedure to remove correlation between the ECG features.
1) Correlation Assumption:
It is always possible to remove the correlation between feature components with a linear transformation, even if the relationship between the feature components are nonlinear [45] . To remove the correlation, the covariance matrix has been calculated from n feature components with m subjects that need to be zero. Let X be a matrix, where X i,j is the jth feature of subject i. To transform every feature for all the subjects to zero mean, let Z m ,m be an m by m square matrix. The D matrix, where the data in X is represented as zero mean, can be computed as follows:
Then, the data in D may be transformed to T , where the variables will be uncorrelated [46] 
where an exponent of −1 2 represents the matrix square root of the inverse of a matrix.
2) Gaussian Assumption: In practice, we have found that some feature extraction techniques result in a portion of ECG features that are non-Gaussian across the population. In our case, we identify these features by performing standards tests on the population statistics (PDF pop,f ) for each feature. Those features that fail are removed from further consideration and not used by IOMBA.
3) Independence Assumptions: Note that while the transformed features are uncorrelated, they may not be independent in general. However, for the case when samples are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution, they can be proven as independent. We apply the Henze-Zirkler test [46] to our transformed ECG data in order to test for multivariate normality. The test procedure is based on the computation of a defined test statistic that is a function distance of the given data and whose asymptotic distribution is known if the data follows a multivariate normal distribution. The statistic can be compared to the asymptotic distribution to test whether the dataset can be reasonably assumed to be normal. Based on this test, p values can be calculated using the statistic computed and determine if the null hypothesis multivariate normality is true. For more detail information, we refer to [46] .
From the test results, if the p-value is greater than 0.05, it means the data are Gaussian. For a subset of the ECG data (mentioned in Section IV), the p-values from the Henze-Zirkler test for normal, abnormal, and BioSec.Lab ECG databases are 0.5203, 0.3557, and 0.7630, respectively. Therefore, since the data is uncorrelated and has normality characteristic, we can assume that the features are independent.
While some prior work exists in biometric-based key generation, there is little work focused on ECG. Our literature survey only revealed one paper. In 2009, Garcia-Baleon and AlarconAquino [16] used a four-level symlet8 wavelet transform and applied a Boolean function to encode the raw feature into the binary. Overall, they were able to extract 240-bit keys from the ECG. However, their technique possessed an intraclass error around 24%, and therefore, Hadamard Code was required for error correction. Even with Hadamard, the FAR is still quite high (4.6%).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Experimental Setup
In this section, we evaluate the proposed IOMBA approach as follows.
1) Databases:
We use ECG data obtained from publically available databases: 1) PTB Diagnostic, which is offered from National Metrology Institute Germany [47] ; and 2) BioSec.Lab database from the University of Toronto [19] , [20] , [48] . The PTB database contains a large collection of healthy and diseased ECG signals, thereby allowing us to test our approach on normal and abnormal ECGs. PTB contains 549 records from 290 subjects, 52 of which have healthy (normal) ECGs.
1 BioSec.Lab database contains ECGs that were recorded at 200-Hz frequency from 13 individuals in two separate sessions (which took place several weeks apart). The BioSec.Lab database allows us to test the reliability of our key generation under more extreme conditions.
2) Feature Selection: To evaluate our approaches for key generation, we consider all the feature selection methods previously discussed. We found that Daub9, DCT, and MODWT performed the best for normal, abnormal, and multisession cases, respectively. For brevity, we only discuss the best results here. Additional results for the remaining feature selection approaches are contained in the supplementary material.
3) Quantization: After feature selection, we remove any non-Guassian features (as discussed in Section III-D) and apply IOMBA to encode the real values into binary. We applied dynamic quantization with maximum number of bits per feature as three for simplicity. α and β parameters were varied to illustrate the tradeoff between key reliability and entropy.
4) Evaluation Metrics:
Since our primary focus is key generation (where even 1-bit error cannot be tolerated), the metrics typically used for biometric authentication (FAR, FRR, equal error rate, etc.) are not appropriate. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we record the length of key per person and use the following metrics to capture key reliability and entropy: a) Reliability: In this work, we segment the ECG signal into individual heart beats via R peak detection. A key is generated from a portion of these segments of the ECG signal. If all bits generated by the remaining ECG segments of an individual are equal to the associated key, it can be considered as reliable. Thus, intra-Hamming distance is used to compute key reliability:
where Ref i is the reference key (average several segments of a sample) and k i,t is the key derived from the tth segment of the ECG. Intra-HD shows the average number of unreliable bits. The reliability can be quantified as
Ideally, the reliability value should be 100%. This is expected to happen when β from (13) is chosen as near zero. b) Entropy: To measure key randomness, we calculate the min-entropy. Min-entropy is used as the conservative measure of the strength of the key and should be large enough to resist against attacks. In this paper, we calculate the min-entropy of a feature k as follows:
where P i (k) = Pr(X = i) for the kth feature of a subject. Note that i ∈ {0, 1}, {00, 01, 10, 11}, and {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111} for features that are quantized to 1, 2, and 3 bits, respectively. ξ is a normalizing parameter set equal to 1, As appropriate, we will examine the average min-entropy across qualifying subjects 2 for features with 1-, 2-, and 3-bit cases separately. In certain instances, we will also examine the average min-entropy of all features across all qualifying subjects regardless of quantization length
If the min-entropy is close to 1, this means that the adversary has the smallest chance of guessing the correct key in the first try. For estimating the min-entropy, the features need to be independent and have enough samples. Note that (19) is a reasonable estimate since the key bits are uncorrelated after applying our process as demonstrated in the previous section. Note also that if the number of qualifying subjects is too small, the min-entropy might be lower than expected. For instance, if we have less than 15 samples (qualifying subjects), then the maximum min-entropy will not become greater than 0.9. Additional supporting details are shown in Section IV-F.
B. Normal ECG Results
Fig . 5 contains the results for normal ECGs. Our approach was applied with different β parameters and the α parameter held to a constant value of 1. Fig. 5(a) is a box plot showing the statistics of the key length as β varies. For relatively small β, the average key length in the population is about 200 bits in length while the minimum is 40 bits. As β is increased, the constraints on reliability become more relaxed allowing for longer keys. For β = 0.2, the average key length is almost three times longer than for β = 0.01. The maximum number of bits achieved for any individual is about 900 bits. Fig. 5(b) and (c) contains the reliability statistics and minentropy with varying β. With increasing β, the reliability decreases as expected. The maximum reliability is about 99.9% and occurs at the minimum β = 0.01. In the worst case (including outliers), the reliability is never worse than 96%. shows the average min-entropy for 1-, 2-, and 3-bit cases. The 1-bit case has the largest min-entropy, but this is a bit misleading. Among all three cases, it requires the least amount of samples and also has the most number of samples [see Fig. 5(d) ]. As β increases, the average min-entropy for 3-bit case increases since more features qualify for the calculation (i.e., there are more samples). With additional samples (see Section IV-F), we expect the min-entropy for all cases to increase. Overall, our results have better reliability and larger number of key bits compared to [16] (only 240 key bits at most with 4.6% FAR). Fig. 5(d) is a bar graph illustrating the average percentage of bits in the key obtained for 1-, 2-, and 3-bit from the features. For small β, the constraints do not allow many features to be quantized into 3 bits. As β increases, the constraints become more relaxed. The number of bits extracted as 1-bit stays relatively constant with β, but the number of 2-and 3-bit cases increase significantly. By including even greater levels of quantization (4-bit, 5-bit, etc.), we may be able to increase the length of the keys even further without a loss in reliability. The conventional approaches in the literature do not have this flexibility.
C. Abnormal ECG Results
We applied the same approach to abnormal ECG signals from the PTB database and the results are shown in Fig. 6 . Compared to the normal ECG case, abnormal signals are more chaotic and therefore have larger intraclass variation resulting in less reliable features. This made it more difficult to determine thresholds for each feature and to enroll users. In fact, we were not able to perform enrollment assuming worst case variance so average case was used instead.
The average key length [shown in Fig. 6(a) ] is dramatically reduced compared to normal ECG case. Keys are on the order of 10s of bits rather than 100s or 1000s. Reliability [shown in Fig. 6(b) ] is also lower on average with much larger variance. Aside from the noise in abnormal ECGs, we also attribute this to the fact that average case variance was used for enrollment. Since the number of individuals with abnormal ECGs are larger than normal ECGs in the PTB database, the min-entropy is larger than normal ECG as can be seen in [see Fig. 6(c) ]. As a result, there are more samples for the 3-bit case resulting in higher average min-entropy than the previous case.
Since is difficult to capture the trends with β in Fig. 6 (b) and (c), we have illustrated the average reliability and minentropy verses β in Fig. 8(a) . The reliability decreases with β as expected. However, the min-entropy increases with β. β is not supposed to impact min-entropy which at first glance is a surprising result. However, we attribute this to the lower number of samples per feature (less qualifying subjects) for small β compared to larger β. With more samples and qualifying subjects, we expect the impact of β to be smaller (see Section IV-F).
D. Multiple Session Results
We also investigated key generation results for normal ECGs collected in multiple sessions from the BioSec.Lab database. User ECGs were enrolled using the first session's data, and then, keys were regenerated based on ECGs taken during a second measurement session. Fig. 7 shows the key length, reliability, min-entropy, and distribution of bits for different β. Note that since the sampling rate, sensors used, etc., to acquire the ECG signals is different between the BioSec.Lab database and PTB database, we expect some differences from the above results.
The trends with β are very similar to those from the PTB database. One major difference is that it was very difficult to obtain 3-bit features for most values of β. The raw signals of the BioSec.Lab database must contain larger variability than the PTB database. As a result, the length of keys is shorter with a median around 100 bits and average around 150 bits. Even with the larger variability, we note that the reliability is still very high for small β (median around 95%). This is only slightly less than for the single session case, which is unexpected since the additional variability between ECGs in multiple sessions is not captured by IOMBA's enrollment process. The average min-entropy is also lower than other cases. However, since the number of individuals in the databases is small (13) , it is difficult to draw a conclusion from this. The reason of low min-entropy that has been achieved from all conditions ECGs is the lower sample size in the enrollment process e.g., abnormal ECG has higher samples between all databases. Fig. 7(d) shows that it was more difficult to quantize to larger number of bits. We attribute this to the noise contained this database. As in the previous cases, with increasing β, the number of the key bits that are allocated 2 bits and 3 bits increases.
E. Parameter Tradeoffs
One of the biggest advantages of our scheme is that it can generate keys of different security and length by changing the α and β parameters. Fig. 8(b) shows the key length and min- entropy versus α with β = 0.1 for abnormal ECG case. As can be seen in Fig. 8(b) , the length of the keys increases by changing the α parameter from α = 1 to α = 0.5. Decreasing α relaxes the constraint on min-entropy to increase the key size. While lowering the min-entropy may be less useful in cryptography, it could be helpful in some applications more tolerant to error such as user identification. Note that reliability (not shown) was relatively static over α. This makes sense since β, which controls reliability, was fixed for this test.
F. Impact of ECG Sample Size on Min-Entropy
As discussed earlier, the min-entropy depends on the probability of each quantization case. If the samples are not enough, the min-entropy will not be as good as we expected. To show the impact of sample size on the min-entropy, we consider the standard deviation and mean of abnormal ECG signals based on DCT. Since we want to compare the size of the sample in min-entropy calculation, we generated random samples from a Gaussian distribution with the same standard deviation and mean for different sample sizes. As can be seen in Fig. 9 , the min-entropy result for different β and fixed alpha value 1 grows as the number of total samples increases from 100 to 100,000. At 100 000, the min-entropy for the 1-bit case is approximately equal to 1 (ideal) for all values of β. For the other two cases, the average min-entropy increase with more samples. We expect them to also converge to 1 given enough qualifying subjects.
G. Comparison With Prior Quantization Approach
We compared IOMBA with its closest related counterpart DROBA from [44] . Table I shows that DROBA can generate longer keys compared to IOMBA. However, the reliability is, at best, only 91.79% for normal ECG (first row), 89.86% for abnormal ECG (second row), and 65.02% for multiple session ECG (third row). Results of our study for two β parameters for different types of ECG signal are shown in Table I as well. Quantization in [44] does not utilize a reliability parameter (like β) to manage the margins of the bins and control the reliability. Hence, additional key bits are chosen that are not reliable enough. In addition, IOMBA is employing α parameter that can control the min-entropy, which appear to be larger than DROBA.
V. CONCLUSION
Biometric-based key generation has to be discriminative and robust enough to intraclass variations. In this paper, we introduce IOMBA to generate key bits with high reliability and good randomness. We also consider discarding features on a perindividual basis to obtain longer key lengths. We test IOMBA on different ECG feature selection algorithms and on various types of ECG signals and conditions (normal, abnormal, and multisession). Our scheme produces relatively long keys for normal ECGs with 99.9% reliability and allows for tradeoff between reliability and entropy in different applications. IOMBA also performed well for ECGs taken in multiple sessions. This is a huge improvement compared to the prior work which extracted 240-bit keys with 7.9% FRR and 4.6% FAR with ECC and without much flexibility.
